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ABSTRACT. This paper explores the importance of accountability to data protection, and how 
it can be built into the Internet of Things (IoT). The need to build accountability into the IoT 
is motivated by the opaque nature of distributed data flows, inadequate consent mechanisms, 
and lack of interfaces enabling end-user control over the behaviours of internet-enabled 
devices. The lack of accountability precludes meaningful engagement by end-users with their 
personal data and poses a key challenge to creating user trust in the IoT and the reciprocal 
development of the digital economy. The EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016 
(GDPR) seeks to remedy this particular problem by mandating that a rapidly developing 
technological ecosystem be made accountable. In doing so it foregrounds new responsibilities 
for data controllers, including data protection by design and default, and new data subject rights 
such as the right to data portability. While GDPR is ‘technologically neutral’, it is nevertheless 
anticipated that realising the vision will turn upon effective technological development. 
Accordingly, this paper examines the notion of accountability, how it has been translated into 
systems design recommendations for the IoT, and how the IoT Databox puts key data 
protection principles into practice. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The ‘connected home’ currently sits at the ‘peak of inflated expectations’ in Gartner’s often 
cited hype cycle,1 and the Internet of Things (IoT) is a key driver of the hype. A cursory glance 
at the consumer IoT market reveals swathes of household goods with the prefix ‘smart’ or 
‘intelligent’ on offer, spanning white good to fixtures and fittings embedded in the fabric of 
the home.2 The promise of the IoT is greater convenience, security, safety, efficiency and 
comfort in a user’s everyday life. While the necessity of many IoT products and services may 
be questionable,3 anticipated growth in the sector is vast: major IT firms like Cisco, Ericsson, 
General Electric and Accenture all predict billions of networked devices in the coming years.4 
The IoT essentially trades on data, both actively and passively, with inputs ranging from 
explicit spoken voice commands to sensed data inputs implicated in such things as movement 
or temperature monitoring. The IoT also aligns with other trends in computing, particularly big 
data, cloud computing and machine learning, with personal data collected by IoT devices 
typically being distributed to the cloud for processing and analytics.  
                                                
1 Kasey Panetta, “Top Trends in the Gartner Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2017 - Smarter With 
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Accompanying the diversity of IoT devices and services are concerns centring on privacy 
and trust. When sensing occurs in the home, for example, patterns of behaviour can be detected 
and inferences made about inhabitants’ lifestyles. Depending who is making these inferences, 
and who they share the data with, privacy harms can emerge. As Nissenbaum argues, 
inappropriate flows of information between contexts can cause harm to an individual’s sense 
of privacy. 5 The nascent nature of the industry means there is a lack of harmonised standards 
for building IoT devices in ways that sufficiently foreground and anticipate data protection 
concerns.6 Building trustworthy relationships with consumers in the new IoT infrastructure is 
critical,7 and not least because an increasing array of high profile stories about IoT devices 
leaking data,8 or being hacked and becoming implicated in widespread distributed denial of 
service attacks,9 contribute to a diminishing sense of trust in the emerging infrastructure. 
Against this background we elaborate key challenges posed by the IoT from a regulatory 
perspective and how these practically occasion the need for accountability. These include 
challenges posed by devices that lack or only provide partial user interfaces and compliant 
consent mechanisms; the opacity of data flows to end-users and the spectrum of GDPR control 
rights; machine to machine communications and the legitimacy of access; and cloud storage 
and international data transfer safeguards. We move on to explore various aspects of the 
Accountability Principle, first its history in data protection governance and then how it is 
presented in Article 5(2) of GDPR. This exploration involves questioning the nature of the 
account to be provided, how it is to be provided, and to whom. We situate Article 5(2) within 
the wider context of GDPR, turning to various requirements of Article 24 as interpreted in 
GDPR recitals, and other related Articles, to map how they intersect with accountability. The 
requirements of GDPR pose distinct challenges to the development of technological systems 
and we subsequently turn to consider the recommendations of the Article 29 Working Party, 
and how they envisage GDPR playing out in the IoT, as a preface to presenting the IoT 
Databox. We conclude by mapping how the IoT Databox addresses the different accountability 
requirements of GDPR. 
 
THE PRACTICAL NEED TO BUILD ACCOUNTABILITY INTO THE IoT 
From May 2018, GDPR will be enforced across all European Union member states.10 It will 
also affect data controllers outside Europe if they target goods and services to, or otherwise 
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monitor, EU citizens.11 Seeking to bring data protection laws into the 21st Century, GDPR 
replaces the pre-Internet Data Protection Directive 1995. The IoT sector is heavily driven by 
personal data, meaning it is critical that IoT developers negotiate their relationship with the 
new user rights and controller responsibilities mandated by GDPR. This includes a raft of fresh 
legal rules governing the processing of personal data, along with extension of the rights 
provided to data subjects and the responsibilities incumbent on data controllers, all of which 
are impacted by the underlying technological infrastructure. 
 
Lack of or partial user interfaces and consent 
The design of IoT devices is heterogeneous. Unlike mobile phones, where users can develop 
mental models about how these devices work,12 ‘interfaces’ to the IoT vary immensely. Many 
IoT devices do not have screens and communication with users relies instead on lights or 
sounds or haptic feedback; text notifications to mobile phones may also be leveraged in the 
absence of direct device feedback occasioned by the desire to create aesthetically pleasing 
devices, which may in turn result in opacity about device functionality. This diversity makes it 
hard for users to understand what personal information is being collected and how it is being 
used. From a regulatory perspective, this shapes the nature of consent mechanisms. Consent is 
one legal basis for processing personal data. Consent follows a notice and choice model, 
meaning it should be informed, unambiguous, freely given and specific to a particular process, 
and enable a clear indication of the data subject’s will.13 Data subjects need to affirm their 
choice, and if the type of data being processed is within special categories of personal data 
(e.g., health, gender, race, or biometric information) explicit consent is needed. Such consent 
cannot be obtained through pre-ticked boxes, silence or inactivity by the subject.14 The 
dominant web-based model takes advantage of the affordances of mobile devices, using 
screens to display privacy policies, and terms and condition contracts containing large blocks 
of text. Extensive research shows users do not read this text, as it would take an incredibly long 
time to do so hence they often agree in any case.15 Even if they did read it, they cannot 
renegotiate as it is a form contract and may not understand it due to complex literacy 
requirements.16 This situation is not ideal and challenges the notion of legally compliant 
consent. The heterogeneity of IoT devices could be good or bad for consent processes. On the 
one hand, consent could be frustrated by devices which, by design, ambiently collect data and 
have interfaces that lack affordances for communicating clear information. This could be 
particularly challenging for homes, where children and adults cohabit, as GDPR introduces 
stricter requirements about delivering clear, concise, comprehensible information to children 
about data processing.17 However, on the other hand, the IoT poses an opportunity to redesign 
how consent is done with users. Taking advantage of new interaction methods may provide for 
the ongoing negotiation of terms of consent.18  
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Opacity of data flows to end users and control 
IoT devices and the digital ecosystems they feed into are largely opaque in how they handle 
data. Insofar as end-users may struggle to understand how their devices work, given the lack 
of effective interfaces, this may in turn lead to lack of legibility in how data is being processed, 
why, by whom, where it is being stored, for how long etc.19 This has the knock-on effect of 
making it hard for users exercise their legal rights and to control use of their information. While 
no hierarchical framing of rights is encoded in GDPR, a spectrum of various control rights 
enabling data subjects to escalate action from controllers is nevertheless discernible and 
underpin accountability in GDPR: 
• Article 15 the ‘right to access’, or the right to discover what data is held by the controller 
about the data subject. 
• Article 16 the ‘right to rectification’, or the right to correct erroneous data held by the 
controller. 
• Article 21 the ‘right to object’, or the right to object to the processing of data by the 
controller. 
• Article 18 the ‘right to restriction of processing’, or the right to require the controller to 
restrict processing of data. 
• Article 20 the ‘right to data portability’, or the right to have a controller provide data to 
the data subject in a commonly used, machine readable format to take to another 
controller. 
• Article 17 the ‘right to erasure’, or the right to have data deleted by controller and for the 
data subject to thereby be forgotten. 
Each of these control rights occasions practical challenges of implementation. If we take data 
portability, for example, how can data from sensors be moved between IoT service providers 
in a usable way?20 Equally challenging and key to control is the need to surface and make 
visible what information is being processed in the first place.  
 
Machine to machine communications and access 
The connected home consists of a network of connected devices, many of which may interact 
with one another. We already see this commercially, with home management system like 
‘Works with Nest’ or Apple’s ‘HomeKit’ linking together manufacture devices and third-party 
offerings. However, and again due to the paucity of interfaces to the IoT, the lack of human 
oversight in machine to machine (M2M) communications makes it hard for users to know what 
is being shared between devices, and if this is contextually appropriate or not. A good example 
is sensitive personal data collected by a smart mirror detecting someone’s skin condition or 
smart bathroom scales sensing rapid weight loss over time indicating health conditions .21 
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Ideally, to respect the agency of users and build their trust, this should not be shared with a 
health insurance mandated wearable health tracker, unless the user wants it to. Similarly, access 
by an Amazon Dash inspired replenishment button, perhaps sponsored by a pharmaceutical 
firm pushing a new skincare range, should have human oversight too. The challenge here is 
balancing the movement of personal data, utility from devices, business models and ensuring 
legitimate access to data by different devices and services. By limiting the role of users in the 
loop, it becomes harder to know if appropriate access is being given (or not) by devices. 
Linking datasets without adequate access management could also have impacts for data 
controllers, who need to ensure compliance with DP rules, and users, who may suffer 
information privacy harms through unexpected data sharing.  
 
Cloud storage and international data transfer 
The nature of remote, cloud based data storage utilised by most IoT devices is also problematic 
under GDPR. Services using IoT sensor data often store collected data in servers located 
outside of the EU. This enables businesses to create large datasets, used in training of machine 
learning algorithms and finding patterns that can be used either in service delivery, or creation 
of new services. Managing big data sets raises challenges addressing the velocity, variety, 
veracity and volume of data.22 From the perspective of ensuring GDPR compliance, users will 
struggle to know where their data is, or how they can access and control it when its storage 
location is likely unknown or geographically distant. Again, oversight over what it is being 
used for becomes difficult and from a legal perspective, issues of jurisdiction and applicable 
law in contract clauses can come to the fore. From a data protection stance, adequate protection 
of data when it leaves the EU is difficult, and measures to guarantee protection, like Privacy 
Shield (which replaced the former Safe Harbor agreement) or model contract clauses all have 
their flaws.23 Furthermore, as mentioned above, Article 3(2) expands the reach of GDPR for 
controllers outside of the EU monitoring or targeting goods and services towards EU citizens. 
Cloud providers may not be able to ignore the importance of GDPR in compliance. The 
alternative of local data storage, keeping information proximate to end users is preferable for 
ensuring their control over how it is processed, and ensuring more user centric, ethical IoT 
applications can emerge in the future. The IoT ecosystem, by design, is opaque, and its actions 
often invisible to end users. In contravention of DP law principles, interactions are being 
designed that provide little information about how devices function, what data is collected, and 
what trade-offs consumers are making in order to receive relevant services. This is not 
sustainable, and risks growth of the sector. It is for these reasons that we argue that 
accountability needs to be built into the IoT. But what exactly do we mean? 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY? 
We are of the view that the answer to many of the regulatory issues surfaced by IoT is to build 
accountability into products and services, by design. Increased dialogue between data 
controllers and data subjects is needed so that citizens can exercise better control over how 
their personal data is exploited in the digital economy. Due to GDPR, interest in accountability 
as a governance mechanism is growing. However, it remains a difficult concept to succinctly 
pin down. The accountability principle is only substantively mentioned once in GDPR, in 
                                                
22 ICO, “Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Data Protection” (Wilmslow, 2017), 
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Article 5(2).24 However, its implications quickly spiral when read in the wider context of 
GDPR, in conjunction with Article 24, various recitals, and other relevant Articles. 
Historically, there has been a strong relationship between accountability and data protection 
compliance. In this context, accountability has traditionally been invoked as a mechanism for 
implementing data protection principles.25 As Aldahoff et al. point out,  
“ … even in instruments where accountability is not called out as a separate data protection 
principle, many of its substantive provisions were in fact designed to enable 
accountability”.26  
The Article 29 Working Party has argued that accountability obliges data controllers to put in 
place effective policies and mechanisms to ensure compliance with data protection rules,27 a 
view endorsed by Aldahoff et al. who underscore the importance of making data processing 
entities answerable – of ‘calling them to account’ - for the implementation of appropriate 
safeguards.28 The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) argues accountability is not a 
prescriptive bureaucratic measure merely concerned with validation, but is about proactive 
leadership to foster a broad culture of accountability.29 The introduction of GDPR puts 
measures in place that further develop this culture of accountability.  
Adopting a similar framing of the accountability principle created 37 years ago in the OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows of Personal Data 1980 
(paragraph 14), GDPR states, 
“The controller shall be responsible and be able to demonstrate compliance with, 
paragraph 1 (‘accountability’).” Article 5(2) 
This means the controller is responsible for processing personal data in compliance with 
principles found in GDPR, which are themselves similar to OECD good DP governance 
principles (paragraphs 7-13). Art 5(1) GDPR includes: (a) lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency; b) purpose limitation; c) data minimisation; d) accuracy; e) storage limitation; f) 
integrity and confidentiality. Where OECD and GDPR differ is in the explicit requirement for 
demonstration of compliance with the different principles. Accordingly, there is a two-part 
responsibility on data controllers: firstly, to put the necessary measures in place to comply with 
Art 5(1), and secondly, to find ways to demonstrate they have complied. This could be viewed 
as firstly a ‘substantive compliance with principles’ requirement, and secondly as a ‘procedural 
demonstration of compliance to relevant stakeholders’ requirement. We shall revisit these 
distinctive aspects of accountability in due course. First we wish to consider what nature an 
account needs to take and to whom accountability should be demonstrated. 30 
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The nature of an account and to whom accountability must be demonstrated 
The current approach in GDPR of not explicitly defining what accountability requires of data 
controllers is intentional. This again follows OECD 1980 guidelines, which as Alhadeff et al. 
state,  
“ … do not prescribe to whom the controller should be accountable (the ‘accountee’), nor 
what this relationship should look like.”  
In their 2010 Opinion on Accountability, the Article 29 Working Party (A29 WP) suggested 
that putting an explicit accountability principle into GDPR would enable case by case analysis 
of appropriate measures, and be preferable to predefining requirements due to this approach 
being more flexible and scalable.31 Seven years on, if we look to the most recent A29 WP 
Guidance on Data Protection Impact Assessments, it retains a non-prescriptive stance about 
measures needed for accountability, beyond publishing DPIAs and the obligation for record 
keeping. Lack of detailed prescriptive guidance around such a central concept is consistent 
with original OECD practice, and keeps accountability sufficiently flexible as a notion.32 
Despite the virtues of flexibility, a sticking point for accountability in practice is the form a 
demonstrable account needs to take.  
In seeking to answer this, Raab argues that giving an account is akin to ‘telling a story’ and 
can be seen to operate at three sequential levels. At its most simple, accountability merely 
obliges an organisation to report back on its actions. The next level requires mechanisms for 
that story to be questioned, and for data subjects to offer their own. The third level puts 
sanctions in place for when an account is poor, either due to inaction or lack of a proper story 
being offered in the first place.33 Whilst this provides some abstract navigational aid, it does 
not pin down the precise dimensions of a good ‘account’. A series of European projects 
including Galway,34 Paris,35 and Madrid36 have been grappling with the nature of 
accountability. The Paris project document elaborates elements organisations need to put in 
place to demonstrate accountability. These largely consist of organisational measures, such as 
establishing policies based on relevant law, setting up internal bodies to enforce these, 
providing staff training on information privacy, analysing risks on a regular basis, setting up 
mechanisms to respond to customer complaints, and providing appropriate redress 
mechanisms. This sits against the wider work of the Galway project, which states 
accountability in general requires organisational buy in, particularly putting in place internal 
standards that correlate with external requirements; access to resources to support compliance 
with policies (training etc.); and internal oversight mechanisms to ensure adherence, coupled 
with approaches for appropriate sanctions and rule enforcement.37  
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Examining guidance offered by the European Data Protection Supervisor,38 and UK 
Information Commissioner Office,39 we also find a range of new measures in GDPR to assist 
with accountability requirements. We cluster these in terms of ‘technical’ or ‘organisational’ 
measures:  
Technical Measures 
Data protection by design and default; including use of anonymization, pseudonymisation 
and end to end encryption; IT security risk management. 
Organisational Measures 
Assigning data protection officers (DPOs); prior consultations; certification schemes; data 
protection impact assessments (DPIAs);40 transparent policies; documentation and record 
keeping on processing for organisations with over 250 staff;41 internal compliance and 
audits for effectiveness of approaches; training. 
GDPR thus puts in place a raft of new organisational and technical ‘responsibilities’ for 
controllers. Executing these responsibilities is not, as the EDPS puts it, simply a ‘box ticking 
exercise’.42The challenge lies in implement these organisational and technical measures as a 
basis for demonstrating compliance. Thus, it is only through the work of doing compliance that 
accountability comes to life. As Ihde reminds us “Left on a shelf, the Swiss army knife or the 
cell phone ‘does’ nothing.”43 The same can be said for the measures mandated by GDPR. It is 
only when they are built into the everyday practice that complex negotiations between 
controller and user will emerge, and we can understand what an ‘account’ may demonstrably 
look like.  
It is equally difficult to succinctly pin down to whom accountability should be 
demonstrated. The Madrid Resolution attempts to set up international standards on 
accountability and states that demonstrations should be to supervisory authorities and data 
subjects.44 However, GDPR is not framed as narrowly. Whilst data subjects and supervisory 
authorities are clear stakeholders, Article 5(2) is not limited to them, and it is artificial to read 
Article 5 in isolation of the rest of GDPR, which places many other responsibilities on data 
controllers. Article 24 specifically focuses on the nature of their wider responsibilities:  
“Taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the 
risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the 
controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure 
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and to be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with this 
Regulation.” Art 24(1) our emphasis  
Article 24 surfaces concepts that need to be read in conjunction with Art 5(2), to situate the 
full extent of data controller responsibilities in GDPR. We focus on the four key issues 
emphasised above. 
 
Nature, scope, context and purposes of processing, and risks of varying likelihood and 
severity. As these two elements are linked, we consider them side by side. In determining the 
‘nature, scope, context and purposes of processing’, recital 76 GDPR states ‘objective risk 
assessment’ is necessary to establish the level of risk attendant to data processing, e.g., if it is 
risk or high risk. Recital 75 provides examples of particular kinds of risk occasioned by data 
processing, including when it results in discrimination, financial loss, identity theft or fraud, 
damage to reputation and reversal of pseudonyms, to name a few. Whilst Article 24 requires 
assessment of risk, in general, it does not call for a Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA) 
in all cases. However, the focus on risk analysis clearly links to Article 35 which requires a 
DPIA for processing ‘likely to result in high risks’. The nature of ‘high risk’ is explored in 
depth in newly released A29 WP guidance, which provides nine examples of high risk 
processing including processing of data concerning vulnerable data subjects, combining 
datasets, innovative use of data for new technological/organisational solutions, or preventing 
data subjects accessing a service.45 Determining the need for DPIAs, and differentiating the 
distinctions between risk assessment in Article 24 and Article 35 is a complex exercise. The 
nine A29 WP examples are quite broad and many IoT applications will likely require a DPIA. 
This is not necessarily a bad thing, as DPIAs are an important accountability mechanism 
providing for ‘building and demonstrating compliance’.46 Nonetheless, it is uncertain why 
Article 24 does not just state DPIAs are always necessary, as this seems to be the practical 
implication of A29 WP guidance.47  
 
Implementation of appropriate technical and organisational measures. The language of 
‘technical and organisational’ measures to demonstrate compliance in Article 24 closely aligns 
with Article 25 requirements on ‘data protection by design and default’ (DPbD). DPbD obliges 
data controllers to safeguard the freedoms and rights of individuals at the time of the 
determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself. This may 
require minimising the processing of personal data, pseudonymising personal data as soon as 
possible, enabling transparency with regard to the functions and processing of personal data, 
and allowing the data subject to monitor data processing.48 In addition, by default, technical 
and organisational measures should be taken to ensure that: 
• Only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of processing are 
processed. 
• The amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their 
storage and their accessibility is controlled. 
• Personal data are not made accessible without the individual’s intervention to an 
indefinite number of natural persons.  
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In accordance with Article 24, taking into account the nature, scope, context, purposes and 
risks of processing, DPbD shall reflect the ‘state of the art’.49 This includes putting appropriate 
technological measures in place to demonstrate accountability and achieve compliance. Recital 
63 GDPR, for example, states that in regard to data subject rights of access, 
“ … where possible, the controller should be able to provide remote access to a secure 
system which would provide the data subject with direct access to his or her personal data.”  
We need to acknowledge, then, that GDPR invokes a turn to the systems design community to 
engage with data protection challenges, though we acknowledge the nature of design’s new, 
explicit role in data protection regulation remains unsettled. 
 
Processing is performed in accordance with this regulation. This requirement brings us full 
circle back to Article 5(2), that the controller shall demonstrate compliance with accountability, 
which in turn pulls on other GDPR provisions. The ‘lawful, fair and transparent’ principle in 
Article 5(1), for example, requires a turn to Ch II GDPR Articles on lawful processing (Article 
6) and consent (Article 7), to name but two. When Article 5(2) is read in context of GDPR as 
a whole, we also need to examine the nature of data controller responsibility documented in 
Article 24. Upon doing this, the breadth of responsibilities implicated by the accountability 
principle become apparent. We believe it requires measures for compliance and subsequent 
demonstration with the entire GDPR. It is hard to isolate provisions of GPDR, as they often 
connect to and explicitly call on other provisions. This is clear with accountability, which starts 
as a narrow principle and grows in scope hugely as we dig deeper. Nevertheless, some elements 
of GDPR align more naturally with the principle. Two examples are transparency (Article 12) 
and record keeping (Article 30). Thus, accountability turns on the ability to question accounts 
provided by data controllers around their data handling practices. This requires that record 
keeping about data processing is in place to demonstrate that compliance with GDPR has been 
considered and actioned. Similarly, transparency is intrinsically linked to accountability. 
Transparency mainly focuses on communication by requiring that processing information be 
provided in clear, concise language which data subjects (and the public at large) can easily 
comprehend. As framed in GDPR, transparency is less about providing mechanisms to hold 
controllers to account. Instead it intersects with accountability by dictating the nature of 
account giving.  
 
ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Translation of the complex provisions of GDPR into more accessible principles is needed if 
IoT developers are to build accountability into the IoT. We thus propose 7 actionable 
accountability requirements, which seek to address key challenges occasioned by the IoT (as 
outlined above). These requirements highlight manifold ‘clusters’ of GDPR obligations. This 
clustering is not exhaustive, but given the broad nature of accountability, we think it provides 
a useful starting point for considering the nature of an account and substantive elements of 
GDPR data controllers need to comply with to demonstrate accountability, as outlined below 
and summarised in Table 1. 
 
Requirement 1: Limiting Initial Data Collection 
GDPR retains the classic data protection principles in Article 5(1) of ‘purpose limitation’, ‘data 
minimisation’ and ‘storage limitation’. According to GDPR, personal data should only be 
collected for ‘specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’ and not processed in a manner 
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incompatible with those initial purposes.50 Only what is ‘adequate, relevant and necessary’ for 
those initial purposes should be processed.51 Furthermore, the data should not be kept in a 
manner which identifies subjects (i.e., not anonymised) longer than necessary for these 
purposes.52 Strict oversight over what is being collected, why and how it is managed is 
necessary.  
 
Requirement 2: Limitations on International Data Transfer  
GDPR provides strict requirements on when personal data can be sent outside Europe. Article 
44 states data should only be transferred to third countries on basis of various conditions. 
Article 45 states transfers can occur to countries deemed to provide adequate protection by the 
European Commission, including Uruguay, Israel or New Zealand, to name a few.53 Other 
grounds mandate that appropriate safeguards be put in place (Article 46), such as use of 
standard data protection contract clauses or binding corporate rules that govern data handling 
in an organisation (Article 47). The Privacy Shield 2016 agreement now covers data transfers 
to the USA.54 It requires companies apply the principles of notice and choice, and 
accountability for onward travel. Minimal oversight is provided by the US Department of 
Commerce.55  
 
Requirement 3: Responding to the Spectrum of Control Rights  
GDPR provides a spectrum of new control rights around data processing, as described above 
in Articles 15 to 21. We frame these as rights users can escalate as needed from access (Article 
15) to rectification (Article 16), objection (Article 21), restriction (Article 18), portability 
(Article 20) and ultimately erasure and the ‘right to be forgotten’ (Article 17).  
 
Requirement 4: Guaranteeing Greater Transparency Rights 
GDPR provides for increased transparency in the relationship between data controller and data 
subject. Information about processing, particularly concerning data subject rights, is to be 
provided in:  
… concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain 
language, in particular for any information addressed specifically to a child … the 
information shall be provided in writing, or by other means, including, where appropriate, 
by electronic means. (Article 12).  
Controllers need to furnish the data subject with their identity, the purpose of and legal basis 
for processing, recipients of their data, and so forth (Article 13). They also need to maintain 
records of processing under their control, including the actors involved, the nature of 
processing, type of data collected, security measures taken, and so on (Article 30). The 
infamous Article 22 also tackles accountability in algorithms and profiling. It provides a right 
for data subjects not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated processing where the 
result has significant legal effects (e.g., refusal of credit) or similar (e.g., prejudice from 
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algorithmic profiling).56 Measures to protect data subjects should be implemented, at 
minimum, by providing human oversight over such decisions and enabling subjects to voice 
concerns and contest outcomes.57 This assumes that the actions and concomitant reasoning of 
algorithms can be made accountable, a challenge in itself, particularly for machine learning 
algorithms deployed in conjunction with IoT devices.  
 
Requirement 5: Ensuring Lawfulness of Processing 
Consent is the most discussed grounds for lawful processing of personal data. As discussed in 
detail above, GDPR provides various requirements for consent mechanisms58 (see Articles 4, 
7, 8 and 9), which are problematic for the IoT. However, consent is not the only basis for lawful 
processing. Article 6 includes other grounds, namely the legitimate interests of the data 
controller, the necessity of processing for performance of a contract the subject is party to, or 
for controller to satisfy a legal obligation they are subject to. Nonetheless, and insofar as the 
IoT finds its way at scale into consumer goods, consent will remain an important ingredient in 
ensuring the lawfulness of processing. 
 
Requirement 6: Protecting Data Storage and Security  
Numerous security and storage requirements exist in GDPR. Accuracy of data is key and 
appropriate security should be provided, particularly against unauthorised or unlawful 
processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or 
organisational measures (Article 5). This is accompanied by Article 32 requirements to put in 
place appropriate technical and organisational measures for general security of processing 
drawing on pseudonymisation and encryption, regular security testing, ensuring resilience of 
services and timely restoration of data after an incident.59 GDPR also has strict breach 
notification provisions around information required and the timeframe for reporting, within 72 
hours to authorities (Article 33). For data subjects, what is reported and when is more 
contingent on severity of breach (Article 34).  
 
Requirement 7: Articulating and Responding to Processing Responsibilities 
GDPR encourages the adoption of mechanisms for data controllers to articulate their 
responsibilities. Data Protection Impact Assessments have a key role to play in mapping risks, 
forecasting their likelihood of occurrence, considering appropriate safeguards, implementing 
these and making this process of reflection public (Article 35). In highlighting compliance with 
GDPR, an increased role is envisaged for certification processes, using seals and marks 
(Articles 42 and 43). Similarly, it is envisaged that new industry codes of conduct will emerge 
(Articles 40 and 41). In responding to established responsibilities, GDPR guides action by 
controllers. For organisations of a certain size, an appointed data protection officer will play a 
key internal oversight and guidance role (Articles 37 and 39). More generally, the turn to 
technical measures, encapsulated in Article 25 data protection by design and default is critical 
for the IoT.  
 
 
                                                
56 Unless provisions in Art 22(2) apply e.g. its by virtue of a contract, authorised by law or by explicit consent of 
subject 
57 Extensive literature emerging on existence of a ‘right to explanation’ and its utility – see Edwards and Veale.   
58 See section above 
59 Art 33 “Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and 
purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural 
persons”. This echoes DPbD provision in Art 25 again.  
Accountability 
requirement 
Source in GDPR 
1. Limiting initial 
data collection 
Purpose limitation Art 5(1b); data minimisation Art 5(1c); storage limitation Art 5(1e)  
2.Restrictions on 
international data 
transfer 
Data sent outside Europe on basis of adequacy decision Art 44 and 45; binding corporate rules 
Art 47; appropriate safeguards Art 46; USA Privacy Shield 2016 
3. Responding to the 
spectrum of control 
rights  
Right to access Art 15; to rectification Art 16; to object Art 21; to restrict Art 18; to portability Art 
20; to erasure Art 17; information supply chain (passing down requests for rectification, erasure, 
restriction) Art 19 
4.Guaranteeing 
greater transparency 
rights 
Transparency of information Art 12; rights to provision of information Art 13 and 14; algorithmic 
profiling Art 22; record keeping Art 30 
5. Ensuring 
lawfulness of 
processing 
Legality based on specific grounds (Art 5(1a) and Article 6) e.g. performance of contract legitimate 
interest; consent requirements Art 4 (11), Art 7, Art 8, and Art 9 
6. Protecting data 
storage and security 
Accuracy of data Art 5(1d); integrity and confidentiality Art 5(1f); breach notification to authorities 
Art 33 and to data subject Art 34; security of processing Art 32 
7. Articulating and 
responding to 
processing 
responsibilities 
Articulating responsibilities: Data Protection Impact Assessments Art 35; certifications including 
seals, marks and certification bodies Art 42 and 43; new codes of conduct Art 40 and 41  
Responding to responsibilities: data protection officer Art 37 and 39; data protection by design 
and default Art 25 
Table 1. Accountability requirements in GDPR. 
 
IMPLEMENTING ACCOUNTABILITY 
Article 25 introduces data protection by design and default into law, and presupposes not only 
that technical but also technological measures will be put in place to enable demonstrations of 
compliance with the principle of accountability. However, as GDPR is ‘technologically 
neutral’, it offers no guidance to systems designers as to how to build accountability into the 
technological ecosystem generally or into the IoT specifically. We first consider specific advice 
from A29 WP for enabling a legally compliant IoT, before moving on to consider the IoT 
Databox as concrete technological instantiation enabling accountability. 
 
Technological recommendations for the IoT from A29 WP 
A29 WP provides practical recommendations for IoT developers based on pre-GDPR 
regulation (DPD 1995), though the principles invoked are incorporated in GDPR. The 
recommendations seek to foster, 
“the application of the legal data protection framework in the IoT as well as to the 
development of a high level of protection with regard to the protection of personal data in 
the EU.”60 
A29 WP focuses on three specific IoT developments which directly interface to the user and 
lend themselves to analysis under data protection laws: wearable computing, such as watches 
and glasses in which sensors were included to extend their functionalities; Quantified Self, 
where ‘things’ are designed to be regularly carried by individuals who want to record 
information about their own habits and lifestyles; and domotics, IoT devices placed in homes 
such as connected light bulbs, thermostats, smoke alarms, washing machines, or ovens that can 
be controlled remotely over the internet. The recommendations are based on perceived 
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challenges to privacy and data protection occasioned by the IoT. These include: lack of user 
control and information asymmetry, impoverished consent, inferences derived from original 
data and repurposing of data, intrusive surfacing of behaviour patterns and profiling, limited 
possibilities to remain anonymous, and security risks. These challenges are considered in 
relation to data protection law and the requirements that personal data should be collected and 
processed fairly and lawfully, which requires that data should never be collected and processed 
without the individual actually being aware of it; the purpose limitation principle, which 
requires that data is only be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes defined 
before data processing takes place; that the data collected is kept to the minimum required and 
is strictly necessary to meet specified purposes, and should not therefore be collected and stored 
‘just in case’ or because ‘it might be useful later’; that data is kept for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which it is collected or is further processed; that sensitive data 
requires that data controllers obtain the user’s explicit consent, unless the data subject has made 
the data public; that data collection is transparent, which requires data controllers communicate 
specific information to data subjects concerning the identity of the controller, the purposes of 
the processing, the recipients of the data, the existence of their rights of access, to withdraw 
consent and oppose data processing, including information about how to disconnect connected 
devices to prevent further disclosure of data; that any stakeholder that qualifies as a data 
controller remains fully responsible for the security of the data processing; and that privacy 
protections be built-in from the very outset through application of the ‘privacy by design’ 
principle. Pre-empting GDPR, consideration of data protection law also includes the right to 
portability, which is invoked in a bid to foster service switching, to unlock competition 
impediments, and foster innovation. 
The upshot of these considerations is a raft of practical recommendations for IoT developers, 
including general recommendations ‘common to all stakeholders’ and more specific 
recommendations for OS and device manufacturers. General recommendations include 
conducting Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) before any new applications are launched in 
the IoT; applying the principles of Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default; empowering 
users to exercise their rights and thus be ‘in control’ of their data at any time according to the 
principle of self-determination of data; informing users of their rights in terms that are 
understandable to them and are not confined to general privacy policies on controllers’ 
websites; designing devices and applications to inform people (users and non-users) as to data 
collection and processing (e.g., via a device’s physical interface or by broadcasting a signal on 
a wireless channel); deleting raw data as soon as controllers have extracted the data required 
for their data processing and doing so as a matter of principle at the nearest point of data 
collection (e.g., on the same device after processing). 
Specific recommendations for OS and device manufacturers include implementing Security 
by Design from the outset; notifying users to update devices when security vulnerabilities are 
discovered or when a device will no longer be updated; informing users about the type of data 
collected by sensors and how it will be processed; providing granular choice over data 
collection when granting access to applications, including choice over categories of data and 
the time and frequency at which data are captured; offering ‘do not collect’ options to schedule 
or quickly disable sensors; providing settings that enable different individuals using the same 
device to be distinguished and to prevent them learning about each other’s activities  
(interpersonal accountability); limiting the amount of data leaving devices by transforming raw 
data into aggregated data directly on the device; enabling user rights, including the right of 
access and data portability by providing user-friendly interfaces that allow users to easily 
export their data (aggregated or raw) in a structured and commonly-used format; users should 
also be able to exercise their right to withdraw consent and have this communicated to all 
stakeholders; furthermore, to enforce transparency and user control, device manufacturers 
should also provide tools to locally read, edit and modify the data before they are transferred 
to any data controller; the implementation of local controlling and processing entities should 
allow users to have a clear picture of data collected by their devices and facilitate local storage 
and processing without having to transmit the data to the device manufacturer. 
  
Enabling local controlling and processing: the IoT Databox 
The IoT Databox puts the local control recommendation into effect to enable the principle of 
self-determination.61 The IoT Databox is an ‘edge’ solution, which is to say it sits at the edge of 
the network in the user’s home, and thus moves computing to the data rather than data to 
centralised computing as currently prevails under the auspices of ‘the cloud’. It is a both a storage 
and gateway device, enabling applications to access online sources of data (e.g., social media) 
and to collect data from physical devices (e.g., smart appliances) situated in the domestic 
environment. The IoT Databox thus collates and mediates third party access to personal data 
generated within the home and data distributed online across multiple silos, which may also 
include APIs to proprietary IoT devices.  
The IoT Databox is predicated on the ‘Dataware model’,62 which sought to develop a 
business to consumer (B2C) service-oriented architecture providing a new wave of personal 
digital services and applications to individuals. The model posits a user (by or about whom data 
is created), data sources (e.g., connected devices or online accounts, which generate or contain 
data about the user), a personal container (which collates the data produced by data sources and 
can be accessed via an Application Programming Interface or API), a catalogue (which allows 
the user to manage access to the personal container), and data processors (external machines 
exploited by data controllers who wish to make use of the user’s data in some way).  
The Dataware model is a logical entity formed as a distributed computing system. Data 
processing involves requests being sent to the catalogue, which are approved or rejected by the 
user. If approved, the catalogue issues a processing token to the data processor for permitted 
requests. The processor presents the token to the personal container, which accepts the token, 
runs the processing request on the relevant data sources, and then returns processed results to the 
data controller. The Dataware model represents a distinctive approach to personal data 
processing, which limits the amount of data leaving connected devices and aggregates data at 
the nearest point of data collection (i.e., at the edge of the network) to enable data minimisation. 
Furthermore, insofar as data distribution is limited to the results of data processing, then the raw 
data is not transferred and remains under the user’s control.  
The IoT Databox embeds the Dataware model in a networked mini-computer, which can be 
situated in the home and placed under the direct control of its users. It exploits a Security by 
Design approach at the outset, storing data in manifold containers rather than one container to 
minimise the potential attack surface and security problems associated with general purpose 
operating systems.63 Data processing is done through apps which, like data stores, run within 
isolated containers on-the-box and interact with data stores to perform a specified (purposeful) 
task. Apps may query data stores, write to a connected device’s store to perform actuation, and/or 
write to a communications data store that sends query results to external machines. Data stores 
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record all queries, actuations, or external transactions performed on them in an audit log, and 
access to data stores is rigidly enforced by an ‘arbiter’ component, which mints and manages the 
use of access tokens. 
Architecturally the IoT Databox (Fig.1) consists of three key components: the Databox (a 
networked mini-computer), an app store (of which there may be many), and data controller/third 
party processors (again, of which there may be many). 
 
 
Figure 1. The IoT Databox Model. 
 
Users interact with the IoT Databox via the Dashboard (Fig.2), which provides users with a 
range of management functions including: 
• Creating User Accounts on the Databox and activating sharing permissions (e.g., that 
consent from all users of shared resources is required for delete actions). 
• Adding Data Sources to the box; including assigning ownership to data sources, annotating 
data sources (e.g., smart plug X is ‘the kettle’), and sharing data sources with other Databox 
users. 
• Configuring Drivers to enable data sources to write to data stores. 
• Managing Data Stores; including sharing stores with other Databox users, and redacting, 
clearing, or deleting stores. 
• Accessing App Stores; apps are recommended by the box based on available data sources 
but individuals can also search for, download, and rate apps. 
• Sharing Apps, with other users within the home and between distributed Databoxes in other 
homes; the Dashboard also allows apps to be updated and deleted. 
• Receiving Notifications; including the results of data processing prior to distribution, 
sharing requests, app and device driver updates, resource contention, etc. 
• Auditing data processing operations; including viewing all accesses to data stores and data 
transactions, and enabling data processing to quickly put on hold or terminated.  
The accounts model and sharing options built into the Dashboard provide the resources needed 
to enable users to manage one another’s individual and collective access to personal data sources 
within the home. 
 
 
Figure 2. The IoT Databox Dashboard. 
 
The app store is secure cloud-based service, which manages a repository of apps and app 
metadata including user ratings, risk ratings, and IoT Databox accreditation for apps that do not 
take data off-the-box. As noted above, there may be many instances of an app store, including 
specialisations (e.g., connected home or quantified self app stores). While app developers are 
free to create their own containerised apps, the app store provides a dedicated Software 
Development Kit (SDK) supporting the app building and publication process. The app SDK 
utilises IBM’s Node Red flow-based programming paradigm,64 which connects ‘nodes’ together 
to create applications. There are three principle node types: data sources, processes (functions 
that operate on data; they typically have a single input connection and one or more output 
connections) and outputs (which typically perform an action, such as actuation, visualisation, or 
data export). Figure 3 depicts an app that takes the output from a microphone, performs some 
processing on the data and updates a visualisation, turns on one or more bulbs, and exports the 
processed data to the cloud. It is composed of a single data source (yellow node), three processes 
(blue nodes) and five outputs (orange nodes).  
 
 
Figure 3. The App SDK. 
 
The app SDK smooths and simplifies the build-test-deploy workflow; it presents a high level 
abstraction (e.g., an app developer can build an app without needing to be familiar with the 
interoperation between specific sources, stores and drivers); it provides ‘scaffolding’ to help 
build an app (e.g., developers can quickly inspect the structure and type of data entering and 
exiting a node); it provides a full testing environment, where flows are deployed (as containers) 
and connected to test data; it handles the app publication process; and, upon submission, it 
containerises an app and uploads it to the app store. The SDK also takes care of source code 
management as all stages of the app development cycle are recorded in a developer’s GitHub 
account. 
Importantly the SDK also seeks to sensitise app developers to the potential risks that 
accompany personal data processing. We differentiate between three types of risk: legal risks 
associated with GPDPR, particularly those implicated in taking data off-the-box including data 
export within the EU, outside the EU, transfer to other recipients, the provision of adequacy 
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decisions or safeguards, and access; technological risks, including apps that use devices that have 
not been validated by the SDK, use unverified code, or physically actuate essential infrastructure 
or potential dangerous devices in the home; and social risks, including apps that access sensitive 
information or produce results that may be deemed sensitive (as articulated, for example, by the 
notion of ‘special categories’ of personal data in Article 9 GDPR).We take the view that app 
developers should be clear about the nature and level of risk of posed by an app and provide 
precise information about the risks they potentially expose users to. 
We appreciate that identifying risk is challenging, given that it can be introduced by any 
individual component of a system (both hardware, such as sensors/actuators, and software, such 
as drivers and apps) as well as arbitrary combinations of the two in particular operating contexts. 
Though by no means infallible, the SDK generates a risk rating for apps, based on the aggregate 
risk of the nodes from which it is composed.  Each node in the development environment has a 
pre-defined spectrum of risk attached to it. The final risk rating assigned to the node will sit 
within this spectrum, and will be determined by how nodes are configured (e.g., the hardware 
they work with, the proposed data rate, the particular actuation to be performed, etc.).  The SDK 
provides developers with a view on potential risk in the course of app construction (Fig.4) in a 
bid to reduce risk in the IoT ecosystem. The risk rating of apps is also made available to users on 
the app store (Fig.5) to further motivate and drive the development of low risk and even no risk 
apps that do not export data, provide users with granular choice over data sampling and reporting 
frequency, provide online access if apps take data of the box, clearly flag that they actuate 
essential infrastructure in the home (e.g., central heating or windows and doors), and exploit 
accredited hardware and trustworthy software. Low-risk apps are visibly ‘checked’ in the app 
store to display their Databox accredited status.  
 
 
Figure 4. SDK risk rating apps during development. 
 
The risk rating assigned by the SDK is reflected in the app store once uploaded. For apps built 
outside the SDK, the app store reviews and rates them based on features and information 
provided, e.g., the absence of an API providing users with access to their data would result in a 
high-risk rating if data was taken off-the-box by an app. Apps may also be posted on the app 
store with an ‘unverified’ status, in which case their risk rating will also be high. However, an 
app cannot be posted on the app store or installed on the IoT Databox without a manifest being 
in place, and data (i.e., the results of processing) cannot be transferred to a controller’s processors 
without a manifest being completed by the individual or data subject.  
 
 
Figure 5. At-a-glance risk (sheilds) and user ratings (stars). 
 
Manifests are at their most basic ‘multi-layered notices’.65 They provide a) a short description 
of the specific purpose of data processing, b) a condensed description furnishing the information 
required under Article 13 GDPR, and c) full legal terms and conditions. The IoT Databox also 
adds app information to the short description, including an app’s risk profile, user ratings and its 
verified status, and enables control over data collection at device level. The IoT Databox thus 
transforms multi-layered notices into dynamic, user-configurable consent mechanisms informing 
potential app users as to the specifics of data collection and processing, enabling granular choice 
over categories of data and the time and frequency at which data are captured, and articulates 
the individual’s rights on-the-box rather than on a remote website (Fig.6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Manifest enabling granular choice. 
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The short layer of a manifest provides a placeholder for a ‘plain language’ purpose 
description. It provides a description of the risks that attach to using an app independently of the 
app developer. It describes the data sources an app might use and also allows users to select just 
which data sources it will use insofar as choice exists. The manifest also allows users to determine 
the frequencies at which data will be gathered, and reported where data is taken off the box. Once 
configured by the individual, and an app is installed, the manifest assumes the status of a Service 
Level Agreement (SLA), which the IoT Databox transforms into a set of machine readable 
policies the arbiter draws upon to enforce a data processor’s access to the particular data sources 
agreed upon by the individual and to regulate subsequent data processing operations. 
 
 
Figure 7. Building runtime accountability into apps. 
 
As more and more connected devices find their way into the home, and an increasing array of 
apps consume personal data and operate on users’ behalf, we expect the ability to inspect what 
has happened and why will become a necessary feature of app usage. For example, I know my 
health insurance app provides quotations based on my activity, grocery shopping, location, and 
financial data, but just how has it arrived at the quotes that it does? Alternatively, one might 
wonder why the radiators in the living room were set to the maximum at 3AM yesterday, or why 
a large order of toilet roll has appeared on the doorstep? Whatever the particular case, GDPR 
makes it clear that the logic, significance and consequences of automated processing should be 
made accountable to individuals. This may in part be provided in the information contained in 
consent mechanisms as a preface to app use but, as the above examples indicate, there is also a 
need to build runtime accountability into the IoT.   
 To enable runtime accountability, and in addition to dashboard notifications, apps created in 
our SDK are bundled with an inspection interface that surfaces how an app ‘operates’, i.e., how 
data flows through an app and how some action or decision is arrived at, in order to support real-
time interrogation by users. By way of example, figure 7 illustrates how data is processed as it 
moves along the flow path. The path summarises how energy data is used as part of a 
calculation of a final score sent back to a third party to generate a home insurance quote.  The 
timestamp and watts listing displays the raw data from the energy data source. When it is 
subsequently processed by the first function node (in blue) it is transformed into an occupancy 
matrix for times of the day, with the values for house ‘occupied’ and ‘vacant’ represent 
probabilities in the range from 0 to 1. Finally this data, alongside data from other data sources 
implicated in the other flow paths (location, alarm and door sensor data), is provided to the 
final function to produce an overall score. As with our attempt to convey potential risk, this is a 
nascent first step towards enabling runtime accountability. Nonetheless we think it an important 
area of research and topic of future work, particularly with respect to how an app’s operations 
are conveyed to users, given the emphasis placed on automated processing by GDPR. 
A unique approach? 
We are of course not the first to espouse the virtues of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). 
In particular, a raft of Personal Data Stores (PDS) or Personal Data Management Systems 
(PDMS) have emerged over recent years. Many provide users, like Mydex,66 with encrypted data 
stores distributed across the cloud against which a wide a variety of third party applications can 
be run. Despite the phenomenal growth in such solutions - the WEF reports that more than one a 
week was launched between January 2013 and January 2014 alone 67 – widespread public uptake 
has been problematic. Ironically, a recent report suggests that this is due to “perceptions of 
privacy and security risks” individuals attach to storing their personal data in the cloud.68  
Alternatives are provided by solutions such as openPDS and HAT. OpenPDS is hosted on 
either a smartphone or an internet-connected hard drive situated in the home.69 OpenPDS 
provides users with a centralised location for storing personal data and exploits the 
‘SafeAnswers’ approach to compute third-party queries inside a software sandbox within the 
user’s PDS returning, like the IoT Databox, only the results of processing not the raw data.70 
HAT provides users with a personal container that also stores data client-side.71 Purpose-built 
‘data plugs’ fish personal data from APIs and deposit it into a user’s personal HAT container. 
HAT-enabled applications can then access a user’s data through ‘data debits’, which permit 
access to raw data in return for specific services. The primary purpose of HAT is to create a 
marketplace that redresses the current asymmetry in data harvesting and builds users into the 
personal data value chain.  
The MyData initiative takes a different approach again. It does not provide a PDS solution, 
but instead seeks to enable consent management.72 MyData thus provides a digital service that 
focuses on managing and visualising data use authorisations, rather than storing data itself. It 
seeks to encourage service providers to build MyData APIs, which enable their services to be 
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connected with MyData accounts. MyData APIs enable interaction between distributed data 
sources and data users, and the MyData account provides users with a single hub for granting 
services the authority to access and use their personal data. While the MyData account lets 
individuals activate or deactivate the sharing of specific data flows and lists currently active 
authorisations, it does not put further measures in place to limit access and minimise data 
distribution. 
Both MyData and HAT expose raw data to applications and thus fail to limit the potential 
‘function creep’73 that currently characterises data processing in the IoT and results in personal 
data flowing unfettered around the ecosystem. Both openPDS and the IoT Databox put severe 
constraints on the flow of data, minimising it to the results of data processing. While this too has 
the potential to expose users in ways they might not wish, e.g., through running multiple 
applications from a developer that allows them to build rich profiles from an array of returned 
results, the risk can be mitigated, e.g., through applications that monitor app usage and notify 
users as to the potential inferences that can be drawn from combined processing results.  
Although openPDS is aligned with the European Commission’s reform of the data protection 
rules, the IoT Databox seeks to respond directly to the external accountability requirement 
mandated by GDPR. In doing so it provides users and developers with a more extensive set of 
tools for GDPR compliant data processing in the IoT. It does so by implementing A29 WP IoT 
recommendations, general and specific, in the design and use of a local controlling and 
processing entity that empowers end-users. In responding to the interpersonal accountability 
requirement, and enabling individuals to manage one another’s access to data, the IoT Databox 
also moves beyond the dominant ‘individual-centric’ approach adopted by openPDS and other 
solutions. As Crabtree and Mortier point out, most personal data do not belong to a single 
individual but are relational and thus social in nature, especially in the IoT where connected 
devices are embedded in the fabric and furniture of buildings.74 The ability to share devices, data, 
and applications within and between homes, and to collectively as well as individually manage 
data processing, is also a unique feature of the IoT Databox model. The model turns upon what 
we might call ‘computational accountability’, insofar as it surfaces opaque machine-to-machine 
interactions and the social actors on whose behalf they operate. Manifests in particular make a 
currently invisible and unobtrusive digital ecology ‘visible and rational’,75 making specific 
socio-technical data processing arrangements, implicating specific connected devices, data 
controller’s and their processors, accountable to individuals and available to local control. In 
doing so, the IoT Databox reflexively enables legal accountability to be built into the Internet of 
Things. 
 
DEMONSTRABLY DOING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
The IoT Databox is able to respond to the 2-part compliance and demonstration requirements 
of the GDPR Accountability Principle. It enables substantive compliance through a variety of 
measures, documented below. It also communicates that compliance with users through 
various forms of account provided by the manifest and the dashboard. In this section, we 
explore how the IoT Databox meets the accountability requirements detailed in Table 1. 
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Requirement 1. Limiting Initial Data Collection  
Limiting data collection in the IoT is challenging insofar devices are intentionally designed to 
collect extensive information in order to provide contextually aware services (such as fine-
grained heating management or home security). Limiting initial data collection also sits 
uneasily with commercial models underpinning IoT technologies, which seek to repurpose 
data.76 Nonetheless, only collecting what is functionally necessary for an IoT device, 
application or service to operate, i.e., for specific purposes, is clearly mandated by GDPR. The 
IoT Databox limits data collection through a number of architectural design choices. 1) Raw 
data from IoT devices is stored in separate containers on-the-box. 2) Computing is taken to the 
data at the edge of the network, rather than data to centralised computing, through the design 
of apps. 3) Apps cannot be installed on the box without a manifest being completed by the data 
subject, which includes the selection of data collection settings. Thus, the IoT Databox enables 
compliance by implementing an alternative architecture for the IoT. The demonstration of 
compliance occurs through data minimisation – the architecture constrains data distribution to 
the results of queries – and granular choice mechanisms embedded in the manifest.  
 
Requirement 2. Limitations on International Data Transfer  
Just where in the world data is distributed to requires attention under GDPR, particularly if 
they are transferred outside Europe or an adequate third country. The architecture of the IoT 
Databox negates many (but by no means all) questions to do with international data transfer, 
in locating data on-the-box, i.e., on a physical device situated in the data subject’s home. The 
question of where the data is stored potentially arises if the data subject runs a virtual back up 
of the data held on the physical box. However, in this case, and unlike current cloud-based 
PDMSs, the decision of where to put the data is ultimately up to the user. The IoT Databox 
thus enables data subjects to control where their data is stored. The question of where the data 
is stored also arises with respect to the results of queries run on-the-box. The outcomes of 
analytics can travel internationally. The manifest again plays an important role here in 
providing an account to the user not only of what will be done with their data but by whom, 
including (in the condensed layer) other recipients of the data, and, where applicable, relevant 
adequacy decisions or safeguards. The manifest also makes it accountable (in the short layer) 
whether or not data will be taken off the box, and if online access is provided to the data subject 
if so. That some degree of risk is occasioned by apps that take data off the box is also clearly 
flagged to the data subject by an app’s risk rating. While the IoT Databox cannot prevent data 
being taken off the box, it can incentivise a reduction in data transfer through the risk rating 
mechanism, with apps that take data off the box, pass it on to further recipients, particularly 
those located outside the EU, and/or which do not provide online access being severely rated. 
Further demonstrations of compliance may be achieved in the future through the use of 
machine-readable add-ons to data transfers such as blockchain, smart contracts or sticky 
policies.77 
 
Requirement 3. Responding to the Spectrum of Control Rights  
In enforcing local control, the IoT Databox negates the spectrum of control rights to some 
extent, for insofar as data stays on-the-box there is no need for access, rectification, objection, 
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restriction, portability or erasure. External support for the spectrum of rights will still be 
required in cases where the results of local processing leave the box, though the raw data is 
retained on-the-box and the specific processing operations performed on the raw data are 
logged for audit, or where IoT devices first export data to the cloud. Insofar as APIs make data 
available to the data subject or data is provided in a common machine-readable format, as per 
the right to data portability, then data subjects may store such data on the box and reuse it for 
other purposes. We note, however, a particular shortcoming of the right to portability, namely 
that it does not cover statistical inferences, which are common to IoT data processing. The 
spectrum of control rights does not necessarily prevent potential harms that stem from lack of 
control over inferences, as opposed to raw data, then.78 The IoT Databox seeks to address this 
situation by incentivising local processing in the app construction and app store processes, 
which emphasize and make potential risk accountable to developers as well as data subjects. 
Thus, the SDK prompts reflection on the potential risks created by an app in the very course of 
its construction, and the app store makes these risks (if they are not addressed) publically 
visible, as does the app manifest. Apps that do not take data off-the-box are also clearly 
accredited on the app store. Local control over processing is further enabled through the ability 
to preview the results of processing prior to distribution, should data be taken off the box. The 
ultimate sanction enables data subjects to immediately terminate data processing and revoke 
access. 
 
Requirement 4. Guaranteeing Greater Transparency Rights  
GDPR establishes a mandate for opening up the opaque IoT and providing more transparent 
information to data subjects. Transparency is key to enabling control rights insofar as data 
subjects cannot action them without knowing who controllers are, and what they are doing to 
their data. The IoT Databox takes significant steps to increase transparency in surfacing 
machine to machine interactions and the social actors on whose behalf they operate. The 
manifest clearly plays an important role in this respect, with the multi-layered notice approach 
scaffolding information depending on intended audience, providing legal and technical 
information as well as ‘user-friendly’ accounts of apps and their data processing operations. 
The app store also enhances transparency in providing social feedback through a commonly 
understood ‘rating’ mechanism. Further to this, the dashboard provides the data subject with a 
view of data processing in real time, including notifications of what the apps are doing and a 
preview function that enables data subjects to see the results of data processing before 
distribution. The ability to inspect how data flows through an app and how some action or 
decision is arrived at also speaks to the transparency and accountability in algorithms 
requirement, as detailed in Article 22 GDPR. Nonetheless, and despite these measures to enable 
accountability, the provision of meaningful information in ‘plain’ language about processing, 
as required by Article 12 GDPR, remains a challenge insofar as it cannot be enforced 
technologically.  
 
Requirement 5. Ensuring Lawfulness of Processing  
It is a condition of GDPR that the lawful grounds upon which processing stand be made 
accountable to data subjects. While a number of legitimate grounds are possible in law, the IoT 
Databox provides only for consent as the legal basis for processing and operating on the 
platform. The use of multi-layered notices, coupled with the underlying architecture, plays a 
key role here in turning the various permissions implicated in consenting to data processing 
(particularly the data sources used, and the frequency of sampling and reporting) into 
enforceable data processing policies managed by the IoT Databox arbiter. As noted above, the 
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data subject may withdraw consent at any time and terminate processing. The limitation of this 
approach is that IoT devices which first export data to the cloud and subsequently make it 
available to data subjects via APIs render data subjects reliant on third party terms and 
conditions, including other grounds for processing.  
 
Requirement 6: Protecting Data Storage and Security  
Given the poor standard of security that currently effects the IoT, there is a lot of work to be 
done in safeguarding data and satisfying quick data breach notifications. GDPR clearly pushes 
towards technical approaches to doing this.79 A combination of IoT Databox approaches assist 
with this requirement. First, the IoT Databox distributes data across containers. Containers are 
also manifold, with each unique data source having not only a container of its own but a 
potential array of containers associated with it produced as the result of data processing (e.g., 
an app may process data from temperature, humidity, and air quality sensors and create a new 
data store that holds data on environmental conditions in the home). This containerised 
approach exploits a ‘honeycomb’ rather than ‘honey pot’ approach (unlike centralised cloud 
servers) forcing an attacker to ‘hack’ each container to access data, which is itself encrypted at 
rest. This approach does not prevent attacks on online data sources (i.e., IoT devices which 
first export data to the cloud), but it does make attacking data on-the-box extremely 
challenging. Furthermore, the arbiter component (in line with consent permissions) regulates 
and manages which apps get to run on-the-box, what data are accessed, and what processing 
operations are allowed to run on the data. The IoT Databox also logs all data processing 
operations, including data export, for audit. These logs may be analysed to identify potential 
data breaches, though challenges exist in working out how to best achieve this (e.g., can 
breaches be detected automatically or is manual identification required by an expert). 
 
Requirement 7: Articulating and Responding to Processing Responsibilities 
GDPR encourages the adoption of mechanisms for data controllers to articulate their 
responsibilities, which are key to increasing public trust in the IoT. The SDK provides a 
relatively lightweight way of articulating compliance challenges to developers in the 
construction of apps and accompanying manifests. IoT developers, especially those in SMEs 
and start-ups, may lack the organisational resources to understand and respond to these 
challenges,80 a situation more broadly confounded by the knowledge and skills deficit 
confronting organisational actors (e.g., lawyers lacking technical knowledge and technologists 
lacking legal knowledge). The SDK plays a key role in helping developers understand key 
accountability requirements and the potential impact of apps on data subjects, articulating a 
range of potential risks, legal, technical and social, occasioned by app development and 
incentivises developers to address them before uploading apps onto the app store. The app store 
in turn conveys the risks occasioned by an app to the public, an app’s un/verified status, and 
accredits apps that do not take data off-the-box, thus certifying that the highest degree of 
responsibility is exercised in data processing by app developers. 
 
Accountability 
Requirement 
IoT Databox  
Compliance Measure 
1. Limiting Initial 
Data Collection  
 
- The IoT Databox architecture situates data processing at the edge of the network in the data 
subject’s environment, enables the data subject to control external access to data via app 
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manifests that provide granular choice encoded as enforceable data processing policies on-the-
box, and constrains data distribution to the results of processing.  
2. Limitations on 
International Data 
Transfer  
 
- Insofar as data is not taken off-the-box by an app, the requirement is negated. 
- Insofar as data is taken off-the-box by the user backing up data in the cloud, the user retains 
control over where the data is placed for storage. 
- Insofar as data is taken off-the-box by app, the manifest provides the data subject with the 
information required by Article 13 GDPR in the condensed layer. 
- The app manifest also flags data transfer as a risk in the short layer, which increases in direct 
relation to access, further recipients and their location, adequacy decisions and safeguards.  
3. Responding to the 
Spectrum of Control 
Rights  
 
- Insofar as data is not taken off-the-box by an app, the requirement is negated. 
- Insofar as data is taken off-the-box by an app, the spectrum of rights is outside the control of 
the IoT Databox, though the raw data is retained on-the-box and the specific processing 
operations performed on the raw data are logged for audit. 
- Insofar as data is taken off-the-box by an app and online access is provided, any data made 
available to the data subject (either via APIs or in common machine-readable formats) may be 
imported into the IoT Databox for other processing as per the right to data portability. 
- As the right to data portability does not include statistical inferences derived from data 
processing, the IoT Databox seeks to incentivise the construction of apps that do not take data 
off-the-box through risk rating mechanisms in the SDK, the app store, and the app manifest, 
and through accreditation. 
- The IoT Databox allows data subjects to preview the results of data processing prior to 
distribution, to terminate data processing at any time, and to revoke access.  
4. Guaranteeing 
Greater 
Transparency Rights  
 
- The app manifest surfaces machine to machine interactions and the social actors on whose 
behalf they operate and processing takes place. 
- Manifests exploit a multi-layered approach to make data processing accountable in legal, 
technical and ‘user-friendly’ terms.   
- The dashboard enables the data subject to view data processing in real time, including 
notifications of processing operations, previews of the results of processing, and inspection of 
how results were arrived at as per Article 22. 
- The app store exploits a commonly understood social ‘rating’ mechanism to enhance 
transparency. 
5. Ensuring 
Lawfulness of 
Processing  
 
- Data processing on the IoT Databox operates on the grounds of consent only. 
- Consent is provided for by the app manifest, with specific permissions to access data sources 
and granular choices over data sampling and reporting frequencies being encoded as 
enforceable processing policies by the IoT Databox arbiter. 
- Consent may be withdrawn and processing terminated by the data subject at any time. 
6. Protecting Data 
Storage and Security  
 
- The IoT Databox stores data in a distributed array of containers, which encrypt data at rest. 
- The arbiter component regulates and manages app access to data stores and data processing 
operations, based permissions set by the data subject. 
- All data processing operations, including data export, are logged for audit. 
7. Articulating and 
Responding to 
Processing 
Responsibilities 
 
- The SDK articulates compliance challenges to IoT developers in the course of app and manifest 
construction. 
- The app store articulates risks associated with an app to the public, including legal, technical 
and social risks and an app’s verified status. 
- The app store also accredits apps that do not take data off-the-box, certifying the highest level 
of responsibility in data processing. 
Table 2. How the IoT Databox meets Accountability Requirements 
 
The IoT Databox thus provides a prima facie example of what a demonstrably compliant 
account might ‘look like’ from a technological perspective, and to whom accountability is 
demonstrated: primarily IoT developers/data controllers and data subjects individually and en 
masse, but also to a potential range of other parties from technical experts to regulators and 
supervisory authorities, whose inquiries might be facilitated by the transparent and auditable 
characteristics of the IoT Databox platform. The account is articulated through a distinctive set 
of socio-technical interactional arrangements provided by the platform, which as can be seen 
in Table 2 demonstrably respond to the accountability requirements of GDPR. It is thus in 
doing being accountable in the course of constructing, publishing and using IoT Databox apps 
that the demonstration of compliance is achieved. That demonstration reflexively tackles the 
various regulatory problems of the IoT, which occasion the need for accountability in the first 
instance. Thus, the IoT Databox makes an opaque technological infrastructure visible, 
providing clear consent mechanisms rendering data processing legible and enabling data 
subjects to control the flow of data, and also provides oversight on machine to machine 
communications along with what the data is being used for, where, and by whom. In making 
data processing in the IoT accountable, the IoT Databox seeks to go beyond remedying existing 
problems with the IoT however. Ultimately it seeks to foster a culture of accountability that 
results in widespread data minimisation, and entirely localised processing wherever possible, 
engendering widespread trust in the IoT. 
 
“Data protection must move from ‘theory to practice’ … accountability based mechanisms 
have been suggested as a way [to] … implement practical tools for effective data 
protection.”81 
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